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BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON AIR TRANSPORT
By 0. J. LISSITZYN"
T HERE is no widely accepted multilateral treaty which provides for
the granting of traffic rights to foreign airlines. Article 6 of the Chi-
cago Convention of 1944 states:
No scheduled international service may be operated over or into the terri-
tory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other
authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such per-
mission or authorization.
Consequently, the operation of international scheduled airlines depends
on the consent of the states to or through the territory of which they fly.
The privilege to fly across a state's territory without landing, and the
privilege to land for non-traffic purposes, are mutually granted for sched-
uled international air services by the parties to the International Air
Services Transit Agreement formulated at the Chicago Conference of
1944, to which the United States and some sixty-five other nations are
parties. These two privileges, which facilitate transit, are commonly called
the First and Second Freedoms respectively. Distinct from these, are the
so-called Third, Fourth and Fifth Freedoms, which make international air
commerce possible. These Freedoms may be roughly defined, respectively,
as the privilege to put down passengers and cargo taken on in territory
of the state whose nationality the airline possesses; the privilege to take on
passengers and cargo destined for the territory of the state whose nation-
ality the airline possesses; and the privilege of carrying traffic, on a route
to and from the state whose nationality the airline possesses, between two
other states. The possession of these privileges by a foreign airline depends
either on a unilateral grant by a state, or on a bilateral agreement between
the state of the airline and the other state. Since World War II, close to
a thousand bilateral agreements concerning these privileges have been
made between the states of the world.
Before World War II, the United States government generally permitted
its airlines to obtain operating rights abroad through their own arrange-
ments with the foreign governments concerned. In that period, few gov-
ernments outside North America desired reciprocal rights in the United
States for their airlines. During the war, however, the policy of the United
States was changed in favor of operating rights abroad being obtained by
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inter-governmental agreements, whenever feasible, and today the United
States has bilateral air transport agreements with some fifty nations. Such
agreements are concluded as "executive agreements" rather than "treaties,"
and are negotiated by teams composed of officials of the Department of
State and Civil Aeronautics Board, with the Department of State having
the primary responsibility. Section 802 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 provides:
The Secretary of State shall advise the Administrator, the Board and the
Secretary of Commerce, and consult with the Administrator, Board, or
Secretary, as appropriate, concerning the negotiations of any agreement with
foreign governments for the establishment or development of air navigation,
including air routes and services.
A representative of the United States air carriers sits in during the negotia-
tions as an observer. Many of the agreements have been amended, some
more than once.
By Section 1102, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of
FAA are directed to exercise and perform "their powers and duties under
this Act ... consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States
in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the
United States and any foreign country or foreign countries. .. ." This pro-
vision is normally cited by the Board in issuing, under Section 402, foreign
air carrier permits to airlines of countries which have air transport agree-
ments with the United States, although its precise legal effect is not free
from doubt. The Board's actions with respect to foreign air carrier permits
under Section 402 are by Section 801 subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent, and by Section 1006 are exempt from judicial review. The President's
power is not merely that of a veto; he can disapprove the denial as well as
the issuance of a permit, and also the terms and conditions attached to it.
It has been uniformly treated as a power to direct the Board's action. It
is the President, therefore, who decides with final effect whether or not
a permit should be issued to a foreign airline, whether or not such issuance
is required by a bilateral agreement, and what terms and conditions should
be attached to the permit. The Board's function is recommendatory.
A typical bilateral air transport agreement of the United States con-
tains numerous provisions, many of which are standard and noncontro-
versial. The provisions which have given rise to most of the difficulties
and criticisms have been of two related categories: (1) Route descriptions;
(2) Standards designed to govern the types of traffic carried and the
capacity operated. Provisions concerning rates may also give rise to some
problems.
The route descriptions, which are usually set forth in special annexes or
schedules, are designed to limit the access of the airlines of one party to the
traffic to or from the territory of the other party. They specify, in terms
of greater or lesser generality, not only the traffic points in territories of
the two contracting parties, but also the points in third states which may
be served under the agreement. For example, the route schedule annexed
to the 1957 agreement between the United States and the Netherlands'
reads as follows:
3 Air Transport Agreement with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, April 3,
1957, 12 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 837, T.I.A.S. No. 4782.
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1. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States
shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified
via intermediate points, in both directions, to make scheduled landings in
the Kingdom of The Netherlands at the points specified in this paragraph:
a. From the United States via intermediate points to Amsterdam and
beyond.
b. From the United States and/or an airport serving the Canal Zone via
intermediate points to Aruba, Curacao, St. Maartens, and Paramaribo
and beyond.
2. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Kingdom of
The Netherlands shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the
air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make
scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this
paragraph:
a. The Netherlands via intermediate points in the UK, Ireland, New-
foundland and the Azores to New York.
b. The Netherlands via intermediate points in the UK, Ireland, Iceland,
Greenland, Newfoundland, Azores and Montreal to Houston.
c. The Netherlands Antilles via the intermediate points Ciudad Trujillo,
Port au Prince, Kingston, Montego Bay, Camaguey, Havana, to Miami.
d. The Netherlands Antilles to New York.
3. Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated
airlines be omitted on any or all flights.
Frequently, the possession of "beyond" rights is very important. For ex-
ample, the omission of the words "and beyond" in the description of the
Netherlands route b above means that KLM has no right to take on traffic
in Houston for carriage to Mexico City or to discharge at Houston traffic
taken on at Mexico City. It should be further noted that the exercise of the
rights granted in a bilateral agreement often depend on the possession by
the airline concerned of traffic rights in third states. On the Netherlands-
Houston route, for example, KLM is not authorized by the Canadian Gov-
ernment to carry Montreal-Houston traffic.
The purpose of restricting the opportunities of a foreign airline to com-
pete for traffic is further served by provisions setting forth certain stand-
ards with respect to the type of traffic (especially so-called Fifth Freedom
traffic) permitted to be carried and the capacity permitted to be operated
by the foreign airline. In the bilateral agreements of the United States
made immediately after the Chicago Conference of 1944, no such re-
strictive standards were set forth. The airlines designated under these
agreements were to be permitted to carry international traffic, including
so-called Fifth Freedom traffic, on the specific routes, and no restrictions
on capacity were mentioned. At that time, the United States was in favor
of maximum freedom of operation for international airlines. Since foreign
airlines were then too weak to offer effective competition, many foreign
governments, including that of the United Kingdom, were unwilling to
grant such unrestricted freedom. In a compromise achieved at Bermuda
in February 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to
include in the bilateral agreement they signed the so-called Bermuda
formula governing traffic and capacity." As conveniently rearranged in
some subsequent agreements, this formula reads as follows:
460 Stat. 1499 (1946).
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a. The air transport facilities available hereunder to the travelling public shall
bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such trans-
port.
b. There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of the con-
tracting parties to operate on any route between their respective territories
(as defined in the Agreement) covered by this Agreement and Annex.
c. In the operation by the airlines of either contracting party of the trunk
services described in the present Annex, the interest of the airlines of the
other contracting party shall be taken into consideration so as not to
affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or part of the
same routes.
d. It is the understanding of both contracting parties that services provided
by a designated airline under the present Agreement and Annex shall
retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the
traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national
and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark
or disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming
from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in the
present Annex shall be applied in accordance with the general principles
of orderly development to which both contracting parties subscribe and
shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related:
1. To traffic requirements between the country of origin and the coun-
tries of destination;
2. to the requirements of through airline operation; and
3. to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes
after taking account of local and regional services.5
This formula avoided the "predetermination" of capacity which had been
favored by the British but opposed by the United States. Yet it imposed
restrictions, though in very general terms. Probably the most significant
element in the formula is the "understanding" that "the primary objective"
of a service is to provide "capacity adequate to the traffic demands between
the country of which such airline is a national and the country of ultimate
destination of the traffic," that is, Third and Fourth Freedom traffic, which
has consequently come to be called "primary justification" or "primary
entitlement" traffic. If either government felt that an airline of the other
party was not conforming to these restrictions, there was to be consultation
between the aeronautical authorities of the two parties--or what came to
be known as ex post facto review. Provision was thus made for a flexible
administration of the capacity standards, which are evidently open to more
than one interpretation in practice. Subject to these standards, the Fifth
Freedom was mutually accorded.
The Bermuda Agreement became a model for all subsequent United
States agreements, and the capacity formula was incorporated, in some
cases with minor changes, not only in such agreements, but also, with the
consent of the other parties, in many of the agreements previously made.
The only agreement of the United States which contains, in effect, a
supplementary "predetermination" provision is that concluded with India
in 1956.
Many consultations under the Bermuda formula have been held between
5 United States and Venezuela, August 14, 1953, Annex, Sec. IV, 4 UST 1493 (1953) Part 2.
6 Air Transport Agreement with the Government of India, February 3, 1956, 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
275, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
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the United States and foreign governments. Most of these consultations
were initiated by foreign governments and some resulted in reductions of
frequencies operated by United States-flag carriers on certain segments of
their routes. These reductions were designed primarily to prevent the
carriage of what the foreign governments concerned alleged to be excessive
volumes of Fifth Freedom traffic. The details and results of such consulta-
tions are usually not made public.
Bilateral air transport agreements and their implementation have from
time to time been criticized in the United States with respect both to the
route exchanges and the capacity clauses. Such criticism has been most
acute in two recent periods-1955 to 1957, and 1960 to 1962. During the
first of these periods, criticism was focussed on the route exchanges em-
bodied in the agreements between the United States and certain foreign
countries, especially Germany, the Netherlands and Australia. Certain
United States air carriers and their supporters charged that the United
States received less than it "gave away," and that considerations extraneous
to the exchange of traffic rights entered into the agreement-making process.
The conclusion of the agreement with Germany" coincided with a visit
of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington, lending strength to the suspicion
that high policy considerations contributed to the decision to grant to the
German airline what appeared to be rather liberal treatment with respect
to the route exchange. In particular, the German airline obtained operating
rights on a route from Germany via intermediate points in the United
States (including New York) to the Caribbean area and South America.
(By the end of 1963, the German airline had not begun flying the segments
of this route south of New York.) The critics of the agreement, notably
National Airlines and the Air Transport Association, charged that it gave
to the German airline access to the traffic between New York and South
America which was, for Germany, Fifth Freedom traffic, to the detriment
of certain United States domestic and international air carriers, and that
the routes via Germany granted to the United States were not of equiva-
lent value. At the behest of the critics, the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce held hearings on "International Air Agree-
ments" and issued a report highly critical of governmental policy and pro-
cedures in the matter.8 Figures submitted by the CAB and printed in the
report showed that according to United States government estimates the
German airline would earn 1,809,000 dollars by the carriage of Fifth-
Freedom traffic to and from the United States, not including traffic between
the United States and points beyond Germany, while United States-flag
carriers would earn only 1,021,000 dollars by the carriage of Fifth-Freedom
traffic to and from Germany, not including traffic between Germany and
points beyond the United States. In further support of its criticism, the
Committee gave the following estimates:
'Air Transport Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, July 7, 1955, [19561
7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536.
'International Air Agreements, Rep. of Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S.
Senate, S. Rep. No. 1875, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED THIRD-COUNTRY PASSENGER TRAFFIC CARRIED
BY SELECTED FOREIGN-FLAG AND UNITED STATES-FLAG CARRIERS
OVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC, 1953
Secured by United States
carriers from homeland
Secured by foreign carriers of foreign carrier





Air France 4,826,000* 3,911,000
Swissair 2,526,000 753,000
* Includes New York-Mexico 1954 figures.
The Committee admitted, however, that complete traffic data for the
operations of foreign-flag airlines were not available, and presented no
estimates of the over-all balance of Fifth-Freedom traffic earnings.
In its conclusions and recommendations, the Committee found no occa-
sion to criticize the Bermuda principles, noting that the United States air-
lines endorsed them, but urged their enforcement. It opposed the granting
of routes to foreign carriers which could not be economically operated
without violating the Bermuda capacity principles. It favored closer par-
ticipation by representatives of the air transport industry in the negotiation
of the agreements, and, to that end, recommended that a representative of
the industry be made a duly accredited member of any United States dele-
gation appointed to negotiate any agreement. Subsequently, the Commit-
tee proposed legislation to carry out the latter recommendation and also
to restrict Presidential review of the decisions of the Board concerning
certificates for foreign air transportation and foreign air carrier permits.!
Such legislation was not enacted by Congress. A bill proposing to write
into the Civil Aeronautics Act the gist of the Bermuda formula (S. 2540,
introduced on July 12, 1957) also failed of passage.
The Department of State asserted that the United States government
representatives in international negotiations "are charged with the re-
sponsibility for taking into consideration the interests and well-being of
all segments of the United States," that in connection with air transport
negotiations "these interests include the interests of the traveling public,
the interests of the areas served by air transport operations, and the inter-
ests of the air transport industry," and that "the government makes every
effort to balance conscientiously all of these interests so that the welfare
of the United States as a whole will be served."'0
The agreements concluded with the Netherlands" and Australia" in
1957 gave rise to further criticism of the "route give-aways" in the indus-
9 See Improvement of Procedures for the Development of Foreign Air Commerce, S. Rep. No.
2586, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); also Improvement of Procedures for the Development of For-
eign Air Commerce, S. Rep. No. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
"0Id., at 10.
.11 Air Transport Agreement with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, April 3,
1957, 12 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 837, T.I.A.S. No. 4782.
"Air Transport Services Agreement with Australia, August 12, 1957, 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1334,
T.I.A.S. No. 3880.
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try and in Congress. The Netherlands agreement was concluded after the
Dutch government had raised the issue at the highest levels-in a speech
from the throne to Parliament and in a special appeal by the Prime Minister
to the President of the United States. The agreement, however, did not
wholly satisfy the Netherlands. The latter nation received operating rights
for its airline on the routes Amsterdam-New York-Curacao and Amster-
dam-Montreal-Houston, but failed to get the Amsterdam-Montreal-Los
Angeles route for which it also strongly pressed. The Netherlands had little
to offer as a quid pro quo in the way of air transport privileges, but good
relations with a NATO ally seemed to be at stake. A Department of
State official described the situation in these words:
... This negotiation was peculiarly illustrative of the conflict of interests
that may develop in aviation relations. Both countries had for some time
operated reciprocal routes under temporary arrangements. Since the United
States airlines felt that the Netherlands did not have much to offer beyond
the rights already enjoyed, they were firmly opposed to the granting of
additional routes to the Dutch.
This view was shared by the pertinent committees of the Congress. In
contrast, the United States communities to which the Dutch proposed services
were eager to have the routes granted and besieged the Department with
letters, telegrams, and personal calls in support of the Dutch requests. In
addition, the views of American aircraft manufacturers had to be noted.
The Dutch airline, KLM, is the largest foreign purchaser of United States
civil aeronautical equipment and now has over $100 million worth on order.
The Dutch wanted extensive additions to their operating rights to the United
States.
The Dutch contention was that KLM is one of the Netherlands' biggest
industries, that it provides necessary foreign exchange to the Netherlands,
and that it is a symbol of Dutch internationalism and initiative. KLM must
be able to expand to enhance the Dutch economy and to assist the nation
to maintain its position in international affairs.
It was up to the Executive to determine what decision would be in the
best overall national interest. Whatever decision was made would have its
critics. Finally it was decided the Dutch should have some of their request
but not all. This enabled the United States to obtain the type of agreement
it desired and air rights beyond Amsterdam. But the Dutch were not fully
satisfied. The United States airlines called the agreement a "give away" and
claimed that they were being made to pay for interests outside the aviation
field. Bills have been introduced in Congress designed to limit the Depart-
ment's negotiating powers in aviation agreements. The community to which
a route was not granted to the Dutch, on the other hand, complained vigor-
ously and one of its newspapers carried an editorial attacking the State De-
partment for the omission. 3
Australia obtained operating rights on a route to London via San Fran-
cisco and New York. The rights granted to the United States in return,
including those on a route through the Antarctic, were not regarded by
the American air transport industry as constituting an adequate quid pro
quo. The Australians, however, were reported to have produced statistics
indicating that a substantial volume of through traffic from Australia to
Europe would be available on the route across the United States. The State
Department felt that refusal to grant the route would set an undesirable
13 Kalijarvi, The Paradox of Foreign Economic Policy, 36 Dep't State Bull. 1009, 1013 (1957).
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precedent. "The bargain was a fair one. . . . The Australian negotiations
showed justification for the route through the United States. Refusal to
grant it would have set an example damaging to our own international
airlines, which need similar rights for their continued well-being."
Since 1957, perhaps as a result of the views expressed by the United
States air carriers to Congress and elsewhere, no additional agreements
provoking criticism as "route give-aways" have been made by the United
States. Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy all failed in their efforts to
obtain routes from Europe to the West Coast. An agreement with the
U.S.S.R. though negotiated, has not been signed, and the contents of the
draft have not been made public.
In the last four or five years, the brunt of the criticism of the bilateral-
agreement system has been directed at the alleged violations or abuse of
the Bermuda capacity standards by certain foreign air carriers, and at
restrictions placed on the operations of United States-flag air carriers
abroad under similar agreements with certain other countries. In this
connection, as also in connection with the "route give-aways" of the 1955-
1957 period, the charge is often heard that the Department of State is
"weak" in protecting the interests of the United States-flag carriers.
Furthermore, the adequacy of Bermuda-type agreements-which were
endorsed by the airlines in 1955-1957-has begun to be questioned.
The peak of dissatisfaction in industry and governmental circles with
the operation of the existing system appears to have been reached in 1961,
when it was manifested in the "Project Horizon" Report of the Task
Force on National Aviation Goals," a hearing held before the Aviation
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce,"8 speeches by high
officials, 7 and a proposal by the CAB that foreign air carriers permits be
amended to enable the Board to require their holders to furnish the Board
with traffic data and to file their schedules with the Board for approval."8
The latter proposal was designed to control the operation by foreign air
carriers of capacity in excess of that regarded by the Board as permissible
under the bilateral agreements. It evoked strong protests by a number of
foreign governments and airlines, who challenged the right of the United
States under the agreements to take such measures.
The more specific causes of dissatisfaction or concern have been prin-
cipally the following:
1. In order to protect their relatively weak airlines, certain nations im-
pose restrictions on the carriage of traffic by United States-flag air carriers
which the latter regard as excessive and arbitrary. Some of these restrictions
are based on interpretations of the Bermuda capacity formula which are
not accepted by the United States.
2. At the other extreme, certain foreign airlines, mostly European, carry
allegedly excessive volumes of what is regarded by the United States as
14 Dillon, International Air Transportation Policy: The Mutual Security Program, 37 Dep't
State Bull. 877, 879 (1957).
" Federal Aviation Agency, Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals-Project
Horizon, 106-129 (Sept. 1961).
"e Hearings on International Air Transportation Problems before the Aviation Subcommittee
of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
'" See, e.g., address by Alan S. Boyd, Chairman, CAB, before the Commonwealth Club of Cali-
fornia, San Francisco, July 14, 1961 (mimeographed).
"SCAB, Orders, No. E-16288 (Jan. 18, 1961).
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Fifth Freedom traffic, in violation of the American interpretation of the
Bermuda capacity formula. The foreign airlines most frequently mentioned
in this connection are KLM, SAS and Sabena. According to the American
view, most of the capacity operated by these airlines across the North
Atlantic is used not for "primary justification" (Third and Fourth Free-
dom) traffic between the United States and the nation of the carrier, but
for traffic between the United States and third countries via the homeland
of the carrier. Most of the European countries concerned have refused to
accept the American view of what Fifth Freedom traffic means. These
countries regard traffic carried via the homeland of the carrier (sometimes
called "Sixth Freedom" traffic) as merely a combination of Third and
Fourth Freedom traffic with respect to the carrier's nation, and therefore
as not covered by the restrictive Bermuda standards. The "Sixth Free-
dom" problem does not appear to have been anticipated at Bermuda. At
a consultation initiated by the United States and held in September 1960
with the Scandinavian nations, the latter refused to accept the American
view, and the consultation ended in complete disagreement.19 It is under-
stood that in 1961 the United States also made an unsuccessful effort to
obtain Dutch concurrence in its interpretation of the formula in return
for a KLM route to the West Coast.
3. The number of foreign airlines operating to the United States con-
tinues to increase. Many of the newcomers may be unprofitable and sub-
sidized for prestige reasons, but every newcomer takes some traffic away
from United States-flag carriers. Yet the United States is not in a position
to refuse operating rights to many new foreign airlines, since it needs
reciprocal rights for its own carriers.
4. Many foreign airlines have shown a tendency to form pools and
other combinations (such as the Air Union, a proposed combine of French,
Belgian, German and Italian airlines, and the Commonwealth pool of
British, Australian, Indian and Canadian airlines), with the effect of
strengthening the competition they offer to United States-flag carriers.
A related danger is the possibility that the governments of the countries
concerned will attempt to exclude United States-flag carriers from the
carriage of traffic between them ("regional cabotage").
5. Some foreign airlines, mostly Latin American, attempt to take traffic
away from United States-flag carriers by charging fares below those estab-
lished by International Air Transport Association (IATA) traffic con-
ferences. (These airlines are not members of IATA.)
Underlying the more specific causes of concern has been the downward
trend in the share of United States-flag air carriers in international pas-
senger traffic, particularly as measured by percentages of numbers of
passengers arriving in and departing from the United States and of
passengers carried across the North Atlantic by IATA members. The
concern with this trend has been accentuated in governmental circles by
the unfavorable United States balance of international payments. Some-
times, it is also asserted that the percentage of passengers carried by United
States-flag airlines should correspond to the percentage of United States
citizens (or residents) among the passengers.
'9 See International Air Transportation Problems, supra n. 16, at 24.
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The two sets of statistics just mentioned show the following trends:
Proportions of Arrivals and
Proportions of U.S. Citizens to Departures of Passengers by
Total Number of Passengers U.S.-Flag Air Carriers to Total
Fiscal Year Arriving and Departing by Air Arrivals and Departures by Air






SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Reports of Passenger
Travel between the United States and Foreign Countries. Percentages calculated.
Share of U.S.-Flag Air Carriers in the Number of
Revenue Passengers Traveling by Scheduled
Services of IATA Members over the North Atlantic
to and from the United States






SOURCE: Annual Air Transport Progress Issues of American Aviation and Air-
lift. Percentages calculated.
Preliminary reports indicate that 1963 will show a significant increase
over 1962 in the shares of United States-flag air carriers in international
passenger traffic to and from the United States and over the North At-
lantic.
The use of these two sets of statistics as a yardstick for measuring the
participation of the United States in world air transport has been criticized
by some observers.0 The number of passengers traveling to and from the
United States by air does not show traffic in passenger-miles and thus
ignores variations in the distances traveled and paid for. These statistics,
furthermore, distort the relationship between the total traffic of United
States-flag air carriers and foreign air carriers by excluding Fifth Freedom
traffic carried by the former but including the traffic between the United
States and a third country carried by the latter. (Estimates of Fifth Free-
dom traffic and revenues of United States-flag and foreign carriers, under-
stood to be regularly made by the CAB, are not made public.) And they
do not take into account cargo and mail traffic.
For the foregoing reasons, these observers say, more significant statistics
are those of the share of United States-flag air carriers in the total inter-
national traffic, as measured in ton-miles, of the airlines of the world.
ICAO publishes statistics of the traffic of all its members' airlines, but un-
fortunately in these statistics "international" traffic in the strict sense is
lumped with much of the traffic between a nation and its overseas terri-
tories and possessions. The share of the United States-flag carriers in the
20 See, e.g., Lissitzyn, The Participation of the United States in World Air Transport: Statistics
and the National Interest, 28 J. of Air L. & Corn. 1 (1961-62).
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total "international and territorial" traffic of airlines of ICAO members
has fluctuated as follows:
Share of U.S.-Flag Air Carriers in
Revenue Ton-Miles, Scheduled International
Services, ICAO Members






SOURCE: ICAO, Digests of Statistics. Percentages calculated.
The United States still remains far ahead of any other ICAO member in
this respect. The share of the United States in 1960-33.4%-was greater
than the combined shares of four runners-up-the United Kingdom
(14.1%), the Netherlands (6.9%), France (6.4%) and Scandinavia
(4.5%). In 1962, the United States with its 31.9% had almost as large a
share as the five runners-up-the United Kingdom (12.3%), France
(8.2%), the Netherlands (5.6%), Germany (3.8%) and Scandinavia
(3.7%) -- combined. It is noteworthy that the shares of the airlines most
frequently accused of "Sixth Freedom" abuse (KLM and SAS) in world
air traffic, as well as in the numbers of passengers carried across the North
Atlantic, have been declining in recent years. The growing traffic of
Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, is not included in ICAO figures.
The most basic criticism, however, is directed at the very concept that
the success or failure of United States air transport policy is measurable
primarily by the share of United States-flag air carriers in international
traffic. In this connection, it is pointed out that the United States cannot
expect to maintain the very high share of such traffic that its airlines
carried in the immediate postwar period, since foreign airlines were then
very weak, but are now becoming both more numerous and stronger.
Statistics show that the recent inroads on the United States share have been
made not by the "older" foreign airlines, such as BOAC, Air France, KLM
and SAS, but by "younger" airlines such as the German, the Italian, and
the Japanese. Attention is also called to the fact that the United States rate
of general economic growth, as indicated by increases in the gross national
product and in foreign trade, has been slower in the last ten years than
that of most other industrialized countries.
The health of the United States air transport industry, these observers
say, should be rather measured by the rate of growth of the United States-
flag carriers and their financial position. By these criteria, the United
States-flag carriers, as a group, have been doing as follows:
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UNITED STATES "INTERNATIONAL AND TERRITORIAL" OPERATIONS
Increase over Previous Year,
Revenue Ton-Miles, Rate of Return on
All Services Total Investment









12 months ended June 30.
SOURCE: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1962 ed.; CAB, Air Carrier
Traffic Statistics, and Air Carrier Financial Statistics.
These figures must be viewed in light of the heavy financial losses sus-
tained by most of the major European air carriers, including BOAC, Air
France, KLM, SAS and Deutsche Lufthansa, in the period of 1960 to 1962.
The United States-flag carriers, however, derived considerable traffic and
revenues during the same period from increased volumes of military traffic,
including military mail, allocated to them by MATS pursuant to a policy
decision made early in 1960. All of the carriers, American and foreign,
suffered during this period from the large growth in capacity consequent
upon the introduction of jet transports.
The rising traffic and revenues of United States-flag carriers in 1962 and
1963 have served to moderate the concern with their position in world air
transport. A CAB examiner recommended in 1962 that the CAB not
adopt its proposal to require foreign air carriers to file their traffic data
and schedules,"1 and a proposal in Congress for legislation of similar char-
acter made little headway.22 In the meantime, pursuant to a recommenda-
tion made by the "Project Horizon" Task Force, the President in 1961
directed that a thorough study be made of United States policy with re-
spect to international air transport by a special high-level Steering Com-
mittee headed by FAA Administrator N. E. Halaby and composed of
representatives of other agencies, including the Bureau of the Budget, the
CAB, the Department of State, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense,
with the participation also of representatives of the Council of Economic
Advisers. The Steering Committee was assisted in its task by two private
research firms which jointly prepared a basic study. The latter has not
been published, but on April 23, 1963, the White House announced that
the President had approved a Statement on International Air Transport
Policy submitted to him by the Steering Committee. " This Statement is
only fifteen pages long. The following excerpts contain the gist of the
Statement with respect to bilateral agreements and related matters:
21 CAB, Docket No. 12063, Recommended Decision (June 21, 1962).
22 Hearing on Foreign Air Transportation before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 7309, H.R.
10655, H.R. 10657 (1962).21 White House press release, April 23, 1963; also in 2 Av. L. Rep. 5 23,066.
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The size of the United States aviation market tends to give our aviation
policies much weight in the world air transport system. This influence must
be placed on the side of expansion not restriction. Within the legal and
regulatory framework in which the system operates, it must be as free from
restrictions as possible, whether these be imposed by government or through
intercarrier arrangements. Any policy of arbitrarily restricting capacity,
dividing markets by carrier agreements, encouraging high rates or curtailing
service for which a demand exists, would be harmful to our national in-
terests ...
... Traffic carried by United States carriers has grown on the average more
than fifteen percent per year over the last fifteen years, a rate greatly in
excess not only of the general growth rate of the United States economy, but
also greater than the rate of growth of our domestic air carriers. Foreign
carriers, as a whole, have grown ever more rapidly. Particularly important
elements in this latter growth are the entry during the last decade, and
subsequent growth, of carriers representing Germany, Italy and Japan; the
growing economic strength of other countries and their carriers; and the
birth of international air carriers representing a number of countries which
ten years ago or less did not need to mount a major international airline
operation. This growth of foreign carriers is, in large measure, the natural
consequence of the growing strength of our friends and allies around the
world.
The result of these and other influences is that while the United States
remains by far the leading international air transport nation, and while the
absolute growth of traffic carried by United States carriers has been healthy,
its share of international air traffic has declined. A realistic view of the future
suggests that the same forces may result in some further decline in the rela-
tive share. The same look into the future tells us that, in any event United
States international air carriers should continue to grow at an impressive
rate, one considerably greater than the growth rate of our economy as a
whole. We are dealing with a United States industry growing in size and
maturity; not one which is sick and declining and can be expected to fade
away to obscurity or death.
The United States policy for air transport includes the following principles:
1. Basic Framework. The United States will maintain the present frame-
work of bilateral agreements by which air routes are exchanged among
nations and the rights to carry traffic on them are determined according to
certain broad principles. The substitution of a multilateral agreement seems
even less feasible or acceptable today than when first attempted at the Chicago
Conference of 1944.
This framework of agreements rejects the extreme positions considered
both at the Chicago Conference and subsequently. On the one hand it rejects
as completely impractical unregulated freedom of the skies, and recognizes
that the exchange of routes is a useful tool in building sound and economic
growth of air transport. On the other hand, this framework rejects the con-
cept that agreements should divide the market or allocate to the carriers of
a particular country a certain share of the traffic. The latter concept would
surely restrict the growth of international aviation and would result in endless
bickering among nations as to their proper share of traffic. . ..
. 2. Air Routes and Services. Our policy is to provide air service where a
substantial need therefor develops. The present network of international air
routes is, however, rather fully developed. Consequently, an expansion of the
present route structures must be approached with caution.
In negotiations for the exchange of routes and rights particularly where
traffic can be expected to be heavy, the United States shall (i) seek such
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exchange whenever it would contribute significantly to the development or
improvement of a service network, and (ii) seek to assure United States
carriers the opportunity to gain as much benefit in this over-all exchange as
the foreign country's carriers. In instances where traffic is thin, our effort
must be to provide service without unduly proliferating the number of car-
riers, and the resulting capacity they would offer ...
The problem of the number of carriers on a particular route or in a market
extends to markets having dense traffic-such as the North Atlantic, which
is now served by nineteen carriers. It must be our over-all policy not to
accentuate this situation which, on its face, cannot be sound.
3. Capacity Principles. The United States supports the "Bermuda" capacity
principles which flexibly govern the amount of service individual carriers may
offer to the world travelling and shipping public. . . .They prohibit pre-
determined limits on capacity, but permit capacity restrictions on certain
categories of traffic, known as secondary justification traffic, on the basis of
ex post facto review of traffic carried. Generally, the result has been to pro-
vide the traveller and the shipper with an increasing range of efficient air
services.
We believe that the "Bermuda" principles accommodate, to the general
good, the legitimate economic interests of all nations engaged in international
air transport. Our policy, then, will be to oppose both arbitrary capacity
restrictions and the stretching of those principles to the point of abuse. We
shall continue to take the initiative in resisting predetermined capacity levels.
We shall also take the initiative to seek agreement to a reasonable and fair
interpretation of what constitutes secondary justification traffic under "Ber-
muda" capacity principles.
Past efforts to resolve the latter problem have not been successful. We
must seek a new approach. Our position will take into account the legitimate
interests of other countries and their carriers as well as our own interests and
those of our carriers. We anticipate general agreement on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the Bermuda capacity principles.
If despite our best efforts we were to be confronted with serious abuses of
the capacity principles, recourse will be had to the procedures available un-
der our bilateral agreements. These including consultation, arbitration, and
in the last analysis, denunciation and renegotiation of such agreements.
The generality of this statement leaves considerable room for interpreta-
tion and application in particular situations by the various agencies partici-
pating in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, it indicates that the
United States government, after a thorough study, continues to regard
Bermuda-type agreements as generally satisfactory.
Shortly after the publication of this statement, the President asked the
Secretary of State "to provide . . . a focus of leadership" for "international
aviation policies," which he termed a "vital area of foreign policy," and
directed the establishment of "a high-level interagency Committee on In-
ternational Aviation Policy, to be chaired by the Secretary of State or his
representative," with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, FAA,
CAB, and the Agency for International Development being also repre-
sented.24 The Department of State also established a special Office of Inter-
national Aviation within its Bureau of Economic Affairs.
A problem related to bilateral agreements is that of rate regulation in
international air transport. Many foreign governments possess the legal
2449 Dep't State Bull. 160 (1963).
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power to approve or disapprove the rates and fares charged by foreign as
well as their own carriers in services to and from their territories. Under
the Federal Aviation Act, however, the power of the CAB is limited to
removal of unjust discrimination in rates and fares in foreign air trans-
portation (Section 1002 (f) ). Despite repeated recommendations by the
CAB, Congress has failed to confer upon it a power to prescribe just and
reasonable rates and fares in foreign air transportation similar to that
which it has with respect to domestic air transportation. The Board, how-
ever, has exerted considerable influence over rates and fares in foreign air
transportation through the exercise of its power under Section 412 to
approve or disapprove the rate resolutions of IATA traffic conferences.
Without the Board's approval, the adoption and implementation of such
resolutions might constitute a violation of antitrust laws (cf. Section 414).
The Bermuda-type bilateral agreements contain provisions on rates
which somewhat vary in content. They generally take cognizance of the
IATA rate-agreement function, but also provide for the contingency of
no IATA agreement being applicable. A considerable number of them,
like the Bermuda agreement, specify that in the latter case, if the two
governments disagree as to whether a rate proposed to be charged by one
of their carriers between their respective territories is fair and economic,
the question will be submitted to ICAO for an advisory report at the re-
quest of either government; but that pending the settlement of the dis-
pute, one of two alternatives may be applied depending on whether or
not power has been conferred upon the CAB to fix fair and economic
rates and to suspend proposed rates in a manner comparable to that in
which the Board is empowered to act with respect to domestic air trans-
portation:
1. If such power has been conferred on the Board, the proposed rate may
go into effect provisionally;
2. If such power has not been conferred, the objecting government may
prevent "the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the
rate complained of."
The practical effect of these provisions became evident in the spring of
1963, when the United Kingdom, following the disapproval of the CAB
of certain IATA rate resolutions, threatened to prevent the operation of
United States-flag services to United Kingdom at rates below those regarded
by the British government as fair and economic. The threatened British
action would not have been in violation of the Bermuda agreement, since
the second of the alternatives outlined above would have been applicable.
In 1963, the President and the CAB recommended to Congress the en-
actment of a bill (S. 1540) which "would give to the Civil Aeronautics
Board discretionary authority, subject to approval by the President, to
prescribe rates and practices and to suspend tariffs in international air
transportation to and from the United States under the same standards
now applicable to interstate transportation."" This bill was favorably re-
25 International Air Transportation Rates, Sen. Report No. 473, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 28,
1963, at 1. Such legislation was also favored in the Statement on International Air Transport Policy,
supra n. 23, at 10-11. See, further Hearings on International Air Transportation Rates before the
Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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ported on August 28, 1963, by the Senate Committee on Commerce."6
An alternative proposal supported by United States-flag air carriers, to
give the Board merely the power to suspend objectionable rates for 365
days, was regarded by the Committee as inadequate. On November 21,
1963, the Committee modified the bill by eliminating the requirement of
Presidential approval of the Board's decisions." The bill as so amended was
passed by the Senate on November 26, 1963.
The Senate Committee stated, inter alia:
The prime need for rate control is not the protection of U.S.-flag car-
riers from the low rates of foreign competitors, but rather the protection
of the American public from excessive and unreasonable rates charged by
IATA carriers with the active assistance of their governments. The problem
of rate cutting in international air transportation is negligible and has been
confined primarily to a few non-IATA carriers. Carriers accounting for the
vast preponderance of international air traffic belong to IATA. As noted
earlier in this report, foreign carriers and their governments have pursued
a high-rate policy which arises from higher costs and a desire to offset losses
on uneconomic routes. This policy, from all indications, will continue. The
U.S.-flag carriers are the most efficient in the world and can afford, and
have publicly declared on many occasions that they wish, to charge lower
rates than their foreign competitors. It is the committee's firm belief that
the additional powers contained in the bill as reported will most effectively
enable the Board to pursue its, as well as U.S.-flag carriers', announced
policy of pressing for lower international air fares.2"
The Committee's report thus appears to refute the contentions, which
has been made from time to time by some United States-flag air carriers,
that the latter need protection from foreign competition because of lower
labor costs of foreign airlines.2"
New problems of policy, diplomacy and law, including those of applica-
tion of bilateral agreements and rate regulation, are likely to arise with
the advent of supersonic transports.
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